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Zeitlan: The Constituional Mandate of Effective Assistance of Counsel: The

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
The first appellate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel1
were based on denial of a fair trial in violation of the due process
clause of either the fifth2 or fourteenth 3 amendments. Recent
cases, 4 however, considered these claims as violations of the sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 5 In this
sixth amendment context, judicial review focused on ascertaining
standards by which to judge effectiveness. United States v. DeCoster6 (DeCosterII) is a turning point in judicial analysis of ineffectiveness claims. DeCoster II established specified duties as a
measure of effectiveness and designated failure to fulfill one such
duty as a constitutional violation. Where such a violation occurred,
the court shifted to the government the burden to prove that the
defendant was not harmed. Furthermore, the effect of DeCoster II
was to elevate one of the enumerated obligations, the duty to
conduct pretrial investigation, to a sixth amendment mandate.

1. See, e.g., Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865
(1953); Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law .... "
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....4. E.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Davis v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 335 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932) held that this provision guarantees the right to "effective" assistance of
counsel.
6. No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976) (opinion following remand), rehearing
granted en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977) (reargued May 26, 1977).
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STANDARDS USED To DEFINE
7
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Powell v. Alabama8 was the first Supreme Court decision
which required that assigned counsel render "effective aid in the
preparation and trial of [a] case." 9 Powell involved habeas corpus
review of a state conviction for a capital offense. The state court
appointed the entire Scottsboro, Alabama, bar as counsel at the
arraignment of the nine defendants. Until the morning of the trial,
however, no lawyers had been specifically assigned to represent
the defendants. 10 "[From the time of their arraignment until the
beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did
not have the aid of counsel in any real sense . . "11 The Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of pretrial investigation: "Neither they [the lawyers] nor the Court could say what a prompt and
thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate." 12 However, the Court never defined "effective," and subsequent lower court decisions have
searched for the precise standard to apply. 13
The first case which attempted to define effectiveness was
7. For general discussions of the history of ineffective assistance of counsel, see
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. GIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Bazelon,
The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 CEO. L.J. 811 (1976); Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departuresfrom Habeas Corpus, 59
VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1077 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. L. REv. 289 (1964); Note, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 1 (1977); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HAIv. L. REv. 1434 (1965).
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Id. at 71. Although this holding was expressly limited to capital offenses,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions extended the requirement of effective aid to
noncapital felonies, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963), and to misdemeanors where a prison sentence may be imposed, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56 (1932). This case involved one of the
three trials of the "Scottsboro Boys," nine defendants convicted of the capital offense
of rape.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Compare Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Diggs
v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945) with United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, Cr. No. 2002-71
(D.D.C., Apr. 23, 1975), rev'd, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing
granteden banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
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Diggs v. Welch. 1 4 In Diggs defendant sought habeas corpus review, claiming that ineffective counsel had influenced him to enter
a plea of guilty.' 5 The District of Columbia Circuit found the sixth
amendment analysis inappropriate:
[O]nce competent counsel is appointed his subsequent negligence does not deprive the accused of any right under the Sixth
Amendment. All that amendment requires is that the accused
shall have the assistance of counsel. It does not mean that the
constitutional rights of the defendant are impaired by counsel's
mistakes subsequent to a proper appointment.16
The court then rejected the due process claim because "to justify
habeas corpus on that ground an extreme case must be disclosed.
It must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and mockery of
justice."' 7 Although the articulation of this standard (the "farce and
mockery of justice" standard) varied, it was initially adopted by
8
every circuit.1
Recent opinions in three of the four circuits which still apply
the "farce and mockery of justice" standard indicate awareness
of different standards which have emerged in other circuits. In
Dunker v. Vinzant,' 9 the First Circuit did not explicitly reject the
established "farce and mockery of justice" standard, but it did ac14. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
15. Id. at 668.
16. Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 669.
18. Bottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) ("a mockery, a
sham or a farce"); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967)
("farce and a mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the Court"); Williams
v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965) ("farce, or a mockery of justice, or was
shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation
was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation"); Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872, 874
(9th Cir. 1965) ("farce or a mockery of justice"); Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866 (1965) ("extreme instances where the representation is so transparently inadequate as to make a farce of the trial"); Frand v. United
States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962) ("trial becomes mockery and farcical");
O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961) ("farce and a mockery of
justice, shocking to the conscience of the Court"); Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407,
427 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953) ("farce and a mockery of justice");
United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1949)
("shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery
of justice"); Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1948) ("travesty on justice").
19. 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974). Counsel's summation was the basis of
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance; it referred to his court appointed status
and to an attorney's obligation to defend even if his client admits guilt.
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knowledge a newer, less extreme standard. The court stated that
counsers assistance did not fall below either the established or
newer standard of effectiveness: 2 0 "It is the factual circumstances of
[defendant's] case, not the application of a lenient legal standard
that disentitles him to relief."2' 1 In United States v. Daniels,2 2 the
Second Circuit found it unnecessary to reconsider the "farce and
mockery of justice" standard, but it concluded that "under either
the traditional standard or any of more 'liberal' standards suggested, Daniels was adequately represented at trial." 23 The Fourth

Circuit applies the older standard: "Ordinarily, one is deprived of
effective assistance of counsel only in those extreme instances
where representation is so transparently inadequate as to make a
farce of the trial."24 In a subsequent Fourth Circuit decision, Coles
v. Peyton,2 5 the court did not reject that extreme standard; but,
like courts espousing newer standards, it did enumerate duties
which constitute effective representation. 2 6 The Tenth Circuit is
the only circuit which has not acknowledged the new standard. In
United States v. Grismore,27 the court stated:
[R]elief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetent or
ineffective counsel will be granted only when the trial was a
farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience
of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only
20. Id. at 504. In a subsequent decision, Karger v. United States, 388 F. Supp.
595 (D. Mass. 1975), the court did not use the "farce and mockery of justice" language, but stated that it was following Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir.
1974), by measuring appellant's claim against the higher standard. Id. at 598 n.6.
Although in Dunker the court had measured the claim against both standards, it
stated that the result would be the same under either standard. Thus Karger should
be classified with Dunker.
21. Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974).
22. 558 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 126.
24. Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866
(1965).
25. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
26. The court "distilled" the following principles from earlier cases:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel
should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often
as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to
ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of
defense can be-developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection
and preparation for trial.
Id. at 226.
27. 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976).
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perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without ade28
quate opportunity for conference and preparation.

In Bruce v. United States,2 9 the District of Columbia Circuit,
which had initiated the "farce and mockery of justice" standard, asserted: "These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a
vivid description of the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing the requisite unfairness." 30 The appellant may obtain relief for ineffectiveness of counsel when he shows "both that
there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in
effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense." 31 This interpretation of the "farce and mockery of justice" standard established a divergent standard, 32 one which requires two elements of
proof. 3 3 Cases applying the Bruce standard generally imposed the
burden of proving prejudicial impact on the defendant. 34 Unlike
the extreme "farce and mockery of justice" standard, which gener28. Id. at 851 (citing Goforth v. United States, 314 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1963)).
29. 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The defendant appealed a district court conviction, seeking to withdraw a guilty plea; the plea was allegedly induced by bad
advice from an attorney who was inexperienced in criminal matters.
30. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 116-17.
32. See, e.g., Testamark v. Vincent, 496 F.2d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1974) (Bruce
standard characterized as the most liberal test presently applied); Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 1974) ("In 1967 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court overruled its Diggs holding and rejected the 'farce and mockery' standard, in
[Bruce]."); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970); (whether the
district court had incorrectly applied the "farce and mockery of justice" standard or
had applied the "appropriate standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, set forth

in Bruce").
The Bruce court also stated: "[A] more powerful showing of inadequacy is
necessary to sustain a collateral attack than to warrant an order for a new trial either
in the District Court or by this court on direct appeal." Bruce v. United States, 379
F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (footnote omitted). But see Moore v. United States,
432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc):
[W]hile a distinction might be attempted between attacks on state convictions under the Fourteenth Amendment and those on federal convictions
under the Sixth Amendment, we believe the increased recognition of the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel requires that the standard
which prevails in federal cases under the Sixth Amendment should be applied equally to state convictions ....
33. See Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509, 516 (8th Cir. 1974). In Houser
the court cited the Bruce standard as requiring proof of both gross incompetence of
counsel and deprivation of a substantial defense. Id.
34. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1976); McQueen v.
Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974) (requiring appellant to prove evidence which
could have been uncovered by reasonable investigation and would have aided defense).
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ally precludes relief,3 5 the Bruce standard provides relief to defendants who prove that counsel's gross incompetence obliterated a
36
substantial defense.
In McMann v. Richardson,37 the Supreme Court considered
whether an otherwise valid guilty plea could be collaterally attacked by assertions or proof that the plea was motivated by a prior
coerced confession. Defendant claimed that his plea had been induced by a coerced confession and by ineffective counsel. His attorney had conferred with him for only ten minutes; despite defendant's wish not to plead guilty, his attorney advised him to do
so because the coerced confession issue could be raised subsequently. The Court stated that an intelligent guilty plea required
reasonably competent advice, "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 3 8 This "normal competency" standard is currently applied in seven circuits. 3 9 Chief
Judge Bazelon, author of the majority opinion in United States
v. DeCoster (DeCosteri),40 and of the subsequent appeal following
remand, DeCoster II, commented that although the "normal competency" standard is gaining acceptance, the new test is relatively
inconsequential because it is "built on words like 'customary' or
35. "[W]e know of no case in the Eighth Circuit or elsewhere which has ever
concluded that the 'farce and mockery' rule has ever been violated in a particular
case." Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 705 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
36. E.g., Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1976); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974). See Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985, 994
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
37. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Although there were two other respondents, only
Richardson claimed ineffectiveness of counsel.
38. Id. at 771.
39. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977) ("reasonably effective assistance"); Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1977)
(" 'counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance'" (citation omitted)); Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1976) ("minimum standard of professional representation"); Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938,
939 (8th Cir. 1976) ("customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances"); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance"); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1973), on remand, Cr. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C., Apr. 23, 1975), rev'd, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearinggranted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977)
("reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious
advocate"); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (en bane) ("customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place").
40. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, Cr. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C., Apr.
23, 1975), rev'd, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearinggranted en bane,
No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977). See text accompanying notes 43-49 infra.
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'reasonable' which are themselves empty vessels into which content
must be poured." 4 1 DeCoster II attempted to clarify the "reasonably competent assistance" standard by requiring that counsel
American Bar Association
perform the duties enumerated in 4the
2
Function.
Defense
the
for
Standards
THE DeCoster INNOVATIONS

Specific Duties
In DeCoster 143 defendant appealed his conviction for aiding
44
and abetting armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon.
On this first appeal, the court vacated the assault conviction as a
lesser included offense. 4 5 Moreover, the court noted, sua sponte,
several indications that appellant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance may have been violated. 46 There were five circum47
stances which indicated the possibility of ineffective assistance.
The record, however, did not reflect whether these circumstances
were the result of inadequate preparation or of informed tactical
choices. The case was therefore remanded to the district court for
41. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 820 &
n.48 (1976).
42. ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FuNcTIoN (App. Draft 1971) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS]:
While these standards may prove useful to the courts [to lessen the ambiguity as to the lawyer's function] it should be emphasized that the Committee has not proposed them as a set of per se rules applicable to postconviction procedures.... It will remain for courts to determine how the
standards may be employed in the context of appeals and other postconviction procedures.
Id. at 11. These standards are the same whether counsel is privately retained, appointed by the court, or serving through a legal aid or defender system. Id. at 222-23.
43. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, Cr. No. 2002-71, Apr. 23, 1975,
reo'd, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearinggranted en bane, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
44. Id. at 1199.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1199-1200.
47. These circumstances were: (1) delay in filing bond review motion; (2) announcement of "ready" by counsel although he was not prepared for trial; (3) waiver
ofjury trial by counsel despite his having made no effort to discover that appellant's
two alleged accomplices had already pleaded guilty before the same judge; (4) indications of a lack of communication between appellant and counsel; (5) call of only one
witness other than appellant. The testimony elicited from this witness on direct examination contradicted defendant's testimony on a fundamental point. Id. at 11991201. According to the court, "[tihis confused the defense case and stripped it of
its credibility." Id. at 1201.
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a supplemental hearing on counsel's preparation and investigation.4 8 In addition, the court granted new counsel leave to file a
motion for a new trial, 49 a procedure thereafter referred to as a "DeCoster motion." 50
In the first decision, before remand, the court of appeals

adopted the newer competency standard formulated in McMann v.
Richardson:5n "A defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent
assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious
advocate." 5 2 The DeCoster I court noted that although this standard is rapidly gaining acceptance, "there is reason to believe that
defendants are not now generally receiving this level of assistance." 53 The court attributed this deficiency to the general nature of the competency standard: It is not subject to ready
56
application. 54 The majority cited with approval 55 Coles v. Peyton,

where the Fourth Circuit specified counsel's duties. In its articulation of duties, the DeCosterI majority stated that counsel generally

should be guided by the ABA Standards. 57 The court then set forth
three categories of obligations which counsel should fulfill. 58 A-

48. id.
49. Id. at 1204-05. DeCoster I established that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim should first be presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial,
during which evidence beyond the record may be presented. U.S. v. Tindle, 522
F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Accord, DiAngelo v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 880,
885 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Contra, Harshaw v. United States, 542 F.2d 455, 456-57 (8th
Cir. 1976) (record itself must contain indications that counsel was incompetent).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
51. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
52. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1202.
53. Id. at 1202 n.21.
54. Id. at 1203.
55. Id.
56. 389 F.2d'224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
57. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1203.
58. The Court enumerated the following duties:
(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often as
necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses
are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical
choices with his client. (2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his
rights and take all actions necessary to preserve them.... (3) Counsel must
conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine what
matters of defense can be developed.... This means that in most cases a
defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses
but also those that the government intends to call . .. [aInd, of course, the
duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research.
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though this appellate court remanded the case for a supplemental
hearing on several possible violations of counsel's duties, 59 only
the duty to investigate was the subject of analysis on the return to
60
the court of appeals.
The Presumption
Claims of ineffective assistance typically required the appellant
to prove: (1) that counsel's acts or omissions constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel, a constitutional violation and (2) that the violation prejudiced the defense. 61 DeCoster I subdivided the first
burden of proof into two issues: The defendant must prove that (1)
counsel violated one of the articulated duties and (2) that violation
was substantial. 6 2 If the traditional burden is met by proof that
counsel committed a constitutional violation, the DeCoster I burden should be met on its first two issues by proof that counsel
violated a specific duty and that this violation was substantial.
However, DeCoster II eliminated the second requirement of the
DeCoster I analysis.A3 Citing United States v. Glasser," DeCoster
Id. at 1203-04 (footnotes omitted). Subsequent cases have cited with approval the
DeCoster court's application of the ABA Standards. E.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,
8-9, 539 P.2d 556, 561 (1975); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).
59. The DeCoster I majority was uncertain whether counsel's decisions in five
circumstances it questioned, see note 47 supra, were strategic and tactical or uninformed because of inadequate preparation. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at
1201.
60. The court of appeals referred to the district court's findings on seven acts or
omissions of counsel. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 19, 1976), rehearinggranteden banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977). However, it was only the district court's conclusion that failure to interview witnesses
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 8-9 n.14, which was the
subject of appellate review. The court of appeals stated that the district court's conclusion on this point "can be read as either holding that there was no constitutional
violation and in any event no prejudice, or simply holding that no prejudice was
shown." Id. at 9.
61. E.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236,
240 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976), rehearinggranted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977) (explaining
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
63. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 20-23 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976), rehearinggranted en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
64. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser the defendant's privately retained counsel
was appointed by the court to represent a codefendant at the joint conspiracy trial.
The Supreme Court stated: "Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional
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II created the presumption of a constitutional violation arising from
breach of an attorney's duty; this presumption eliminated the need
to prove "substantial violation."
In DeCosterI the court remanded for the initial determination
of whether any violation had occurred. 6 5 Thus, only in DeCoster
11 did the court progress to the second stage of the inquiry to determine if the violation was substantial. In this second stage, the
majority referred to Pinkney v. United States66 which had defined
"'substantial" as "consequential," the impairment of a defense. Defendant in DeCoster II retained the burden of proving that the
violation had impaired the defense; 67 but the court of appeals in
DeCoster II articulated its newly created presumption: "In certain
circumstances . . . the acts or omissions of counsel are so likely to
have impaired the defense, and yet this consequence would be so
difficult to prove, that, in accordance with well established evidentiary principles, such impairment can be presumed." 68 The court
burden of representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness." Id. at 75. The Court refused to inquire into the amount of prejudice which
resulted because "[tihe right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id. at 76. Hence, the Court held there was a denial of
effective assistance of counsel. Courts in subsequent cases have presumed a constitutional violation without inquiring into the extent of prejudice in situations of late
appointment of counsel, Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973); Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966). But see Rastrom v.
Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1971); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1970). The presumption was also applied in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976). The Supreme Court in Geders held that the trial court's order preventing
defendant from consulting his attorney during the overnight recess between his direct and cross-examination impinged his sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel. The order was inherently suspect and no showing of prejudice was required. Id. at 1337 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1201.
66. 543 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The basis for the Pinkney claim of ineffective assistance was counsel's failure to inform defendant of the contents of the
Government's sentencing memorandum. Although defendant offered no proof of any
violation, the opinion cited DeCoster I with approval: "[W]e readily reaffirm, that
once a substantial violation of counsel's duties is shown, the Government's burden is
to demonstrate lack of prejudice therefrom .... " Pinkney v. United States, 543 F.2d
908, 916 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
67. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 20 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976) (citing United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1976)), rehearing
granted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
68. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 20 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976), rehearing granted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977). The court
cited: Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970); Coles v. Peyton, 389
F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (cases presuming prejudice
from the nature of counsel's violation); and C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 343 (Cleary
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created the rebuttable presumption6 9 that counsel's failure to conduct factual investigations 70 impaired the defense. 7 ' The decision
thus held failure to investigate to be another act presumptively injurious to the defendant: Such a violation is substantial per se.
Defendant need only show that counsel violated an ABA Standard 79-here, the duty to investigate-to establish a constitutional
violation. Hence, this decision elevates an ABA Standard, intended
merely as a guideline, 73 to a sixth amendment mandate.
The Burden of Proof
Traditional analysis required the defendant to bear the burden
of proof on two issues: the existence of a constitutional violation
and its resultant prejudice. 74 DeCoster II eliminated the first burden by an explicit presumption which established the constitutional
violation and shifted the second burden to the Government according to harmless error analysis. This analysis recognizes that some
constitutional violations may be harmless if proven as such by the
beneficiary of that error.
Prior to DeCoster I1, Chief Judge Bazelon noted that frequent
reversals would have a prophylactic impact on the effectiveness of
assistance rendered to indigent defendants. 75 Chief Judge Bazelon's

ed. 1972) ("The most important consideration in the creation of presumption is probability.") United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 20 n.32 (D.C. Cir., Oct.
19, 1976), rehearinggranted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
69. Id. at 23 n.38.
70. "[W]hile counsel may have been fully justified in not calling the codefendants or any other witnesses, his failure to interview them violated the duty to investigate." United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 19 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976),
rehearing granted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977). The dissent in
DeCosterII, however, argued that there had been no violation of the duty to investigate, because the neglected investigation would have been of a fabricated defense.
Id. at 9 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 21-23.
72. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 42, and text accompanying note 42.
73. Id. at 154.
74. See, e.g., cases cited note 61 supra.
75. Chief Judge Bazelon commented:
It seems to me reversing convictions will have a prophylactic effect for
several reasons. First, insofar as trial judges and prosecutors can prevent
ineffectiveness from tainting a plea or trial, they will be encouraged to do
so. . . . Second, insofar as ineffective assistance results from indifferent or incompetent lawyers, such lawyers are less likely to receive appointments.
. ..Third, insofar as ineffective assistance results from appointed counsel or
public defenders accepting an unmanageable caseload, they will be encouraged to refuse cases, and judges will be discouraged from appointing them.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 12
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 245

view could rely on the scant authority which supports automatic reversal upon the finding of a constitutional violation of counsel's duty
to investigate.1 6 However, Chief Judge Bazelon did not rely on automatic reversal in DeCoster 1I. Instead of halting the inquiry upon
finding a constitutional violation, the DeCoster 11 majority proceeded to harmless error analysis. Automatic reversal might have
been rejected because harmless error analysis, a method approved
by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,77 would yield
the same result. Moreover, automatic reversal, which required that
all constitutional violations be found harmful per se, had been explicitly rejected in Chapman.7 Thus, the DeCoster II majority relied on precedent to achieve a firmer foundation for its result than
a policy of automatic reversal would have provided.
Despite no mention of Chapman or harmless error analysis in
DeCoster I, the DeCoster 11 majority adopted this approach. The
use of this analysis is traceable to an article by Chief Judge
Bazelon, 79 written in the period between the two DeCoster decisions, which recognized a mistake in the first decision:

Finally, frequent reversals are likely to attract the attention of the press, and
through it the public, and that exposure will enhance the likelihood of legislative action.
Bazelon, supra note 41, at 822 n.5 (citations omitted). But see United States v. Hurt,
543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Hurt because appellate counsel charged that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the trial attorney sued appellate counsel for
libel. The case from which the libel suit arose was remanded to the district court to
determine if trial counsel had been ineffective. The appellate counsel asked to be
excused from participating in the remand hearing because he was fearful that his
further participation would only aggravate the pending libel suit against him. The
district courts refused to excuse appellate counsel from participating in the remand
hearing; on appeal, the court held that appellate counsel's forced participation in the
remand hearing hindered his effectiveness. Id. at 163.
76. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 1974); R. TRAYNOR,
THE RiDDLE OF HARILESS ERROR 57 (1970). Subsequent to United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing granted en banc, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977), the Ninth Circuit applied automatic reversal. See Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman concerned a prosecutor's comment regarding
petitioner's failure to testify; subsequent judicial instructions permitted inferences of
guilt from that failure to testify. It is possible to limit the Court's holding to "illegally
admitting very prejudicial evidence or comments." Id. at 24. However, the Court said
without qualification that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt," id. This statement suggests that there is no limitation upon the type of constitutional error that may be considered in harmless error analysis.
78. Id. at 21-22.
79. Bazelon, supra note 41.
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The question of prejudice is analytically separate from the
question of whether the defendant's sixth amendment rights
were violated. The "mockery" and "gross incompetence blotting
out a substantial defense" tests failed to recognize this distinction
by blurring the issue of ineffectiveness with the question of prej-

udice. DeCoster, I have come to realize makes the same mistake.... A nonprejudicial denial of effective assistance need not

result in reversal, but the analysis should be distinct.8 0

Chief Judge Bazelon then approved the Chapman harmless
error analysis: 8 ' "[ilf anything, courts should apply Chapman with
greater, not lesser, force in reviewing ineffectiveness of counsel
claims, since the finding of ineffectiveness necessarily casts grave
doubt on the entire adjudicative process." 8 2 Thus, the mistake in
the first opinion of commingling the analysis of the existence of a
constitutional violation with that of prejudice was corrected in the
second opinion: "The primary distinction between our approach
and that followed in the cases cited is that we distinguish between
the question of whether counsel's violations were consequential,
i.e., impaired the defense, and the question of whether the im83
pairment was harmful, i.e., affected the outcome."
Thus, the DeCoster 11 majority used a harmless error analysis
to shift the burden to the Government, following Chapman.84
The majority's decision to place the burden on the Government to
prove harmless error reflected its desire to "avoid effectively
penalizing a defendant for his counsel's failures" where such a burden is impossible to meet by either the Government or the defendant.8 5 The result, reversal and remand, was the same as that
which automatic reversal would have produced because the allocation of the burden was dispositive in this case.
In dissent in DeCoster II, Judge MacKinnon distinguished the
cases of presumed prejudice cited by the majority. He described
his view of DeCoster II, stating:

80. Id. at 825 n.65.
81. Id. at 825.
82. Id.

83. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 21 n.32 (D.C. Cir., Oct.
19, 1976), rehearing granted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977). The
cases cited were Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970) and Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
84. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 23-25 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976), rehearinggranted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
85. Id. at 25.
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This is not a case where counsel had insufficient time to consult
with the defendant, where there was an obvious conflict of
interest, or where the court denied the defendant his right to
confer with his counsel. Here, every alleged failing relates to a
subjective decision made with sufficient time, without conflict of
interest and with ample opportunity to consult. Prejudice is not
inherent or obvious and must be proved.8 6
Unlike the majority, Judge MacKinnon did not presume prejudice.
He would require that the defendant prove prejudice as part of the
burden of proving a constitutional violation. The dissenting judge
characterized the means by which the majority separated the
analysis of harm from that of the existence of a constitutional violation as "an exercise in elementary semantics."8 7 The dissent maintained that proof of prejudice is necessarily integrated in proof of a
constitutional violation. Judge MacKinnon asserted that Chapman
v. California88 had shifted the burden to the Government according
to harmless error analysis only "after a substantial constitutional
violation had been found. [Yet in DeCoster II] the existence of
constitutional error is the issue, and the majority has presented
neither facts nor law to establish that any constitutional right of
defendant has been violated at all, particularly his sixth amend89
ment counsel right."
In sum, there are two means to establish a constitutional violation: (1) the use of a presumption or (2) the satisfaction of the burden by affirmative proof. According to the dissent, the presumption invoked was inappropriate90 and the defendant did not meet
the required burden of proof.91 Therefore, since a constitutional
violation had not been established, the majority's progression to
harmless error analysis which shifted the burden to the Government was unwarranted. The essence of the disagreement between
majority and dissent lies in the majority's presumption that
counsel's failure to investigate was a constitutional violation. This,
in turn, triggered the shift of the burden to the Government on the
prejudice issue; the dissent viewed the initial presumption as inap86. Id. at 33-34 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
87. Id. at 54 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
88. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
89. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 55 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), rehearing granted en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir., Mar. 17, 1977) (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 33-34 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
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propriate and therefore demanded that defendant prove a constitutional violation.
Scope of Application of DeCoster H
The scope of application of the DeCoster II presumption remains to be determined by subsequent decisions. Although the
presumption raised involved counsel's failure to investigate, the
degree of dereliction necessary to invoke this presumption was not
elucidated. The opinion indicated that failure to interview only
certain named witnesses would not raise the presumption, 92 but
that total failure to investigate would raise the presumption. It is
unclear whether near-total failure is necessary to trigger the presumption of impaired defense. Perhaps less egregious failure would
suffice.
Also unanswered by DeCoster II is the extent of its applicability to violations of other enumerated ABA duties. The opinion
leaves uncertain which other duties qualify as "inherently prejudicial." One does not know, for example, whether total failure to
discuss tactics with the client would raise the presumption of impaired defense. 93 Also unanswered is whether the nature of the
violation, the degree of dereliction, or a weighted combination of
these factors is determinative. Equally nebulous is whether there
can be any predetermined set of violations sufficient to raise a presumption, given that the DeCoster H court disagreed as to whether
the violation involved was inherently prejudicial. Without such a
predetermination, case-by-case analysis-the focus advocated by
the dissent-may be necessary. 9 4 In that event, the presumption
could only be appropriately applied where the failure to investigate
is comparable to that which occurred in DeCoster; the courts may
therefore be unwilling to extend the use of the presumption to
other duties.
92.

Id. at 22 n.36.

93. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing
granted en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1977), indicated the duty to discuss fully potential strategies with defendant. Id. at 10. A subsequent opinion by
Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
required appellant to show more than was required in DeCoster II; defendant in
Moore was required to show that counsel's failure to consult with the defendant on a
trial issue impaired the defense. United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d at 1092. Thus, it
appears that counsel's violation of this duty will not, by itself, create a presumption
of impaired defense.
94. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 34 (D.C. Cir., Oct 19,
1976) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), rehearinggranted en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir.,
Mar. 17, 1977).
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CONCLUSION

The "competency" standard, the new measure of effectiveness
of counsel, is rapidly gaining acceptance. It protects defendants
more fully than the "farce and mockery of justice" standard, which
grants relief only when counsel has been grossly ineffective. Even
the dissent in DeCoster II concurred in the need for the competency standard. 95 Although several circuits have not yet rejected
the older "farce and mockery of justice" standard, recent opinions
in three of those circuits indicate that their decisions would have
been the same under either standard. Therefore, the newer standard may be readily applied in an appropriate future case: a case
where the attorney's performance is more competent than a "farce
and mockery of justice" but not "reasonably competent."
To apply the competency standard with consistency, specific
duties which constitute effective assistance must be established. If
defendant is relieved of the burden of proving that counsel's failure
to perform one of those duties impaired the defense, then violation
of that duty is a constitutional violation per se. Hence, that duty
becomes a sixth amendment mandate.
In DeCoster II the nature of the violation, failure to investigate, led the majority to create the presumption that there had
been a substantial constitutional violation. For other violations,
however, the defendant would still be required to prove that
counsel's acts or omissions were substantial. Once a constitutional
violation is proven, either by presumption or by proof, harmless
error analysis is appropriate. 96
DeCoster II would be less troublesome if it did not involve an
appellant who subsequently, in effect, admitted guilt.9 7 The dissent
stated that "the extent of any investigation by counsel necessarily
must be affected by the guilt or innocence of a defendant," 98 and
thus "[o]nce defense counsel has reasonable ground for believing
his client guilty, the extent of the investigation required is substantially diminished. 99 There is great danger in this approach: It
95. Id. at 2 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
96. The Supreme Court held that once a constitutional violation has been established, harmless error analysis is appropriate. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

18 (1967). See also note 77 supra.
97. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 23 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19,
1976) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), rehearing granted en bane, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir., Mar. 17, 1977).
98. Id. at 11 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 12 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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would subject the defendant to an additional "trial" to obtain his
sixth amendment right, because it would convert assigned counsel
into a first instance judge of defendant. Effective assistance of
counsel is a constitutional guarantee; no initial trial should be required to obtain this right. It would be unfair to diminish this right
by inference, conjecture, or whim of assigned counsel. Even with
an admission of guilt, the ABA has stated that the "duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to
the lawyer of fact constituting guilt."' 10 0
However, the issue in DeCoster II was not appellant's subsequent statement; rather, it was his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. That guarantee requires that attorneys'
choices be deliberate rather than uninformed decisions made without adequate preparation.' 0 ' In civil malpractice cases, monetary
damages compensate one who has suffered ineffective assistance of
counsel. In criminal cases, however, no such remedy is available
because ineffective assistance of counsel threatens defendants' personal liberty. The importance of personal liberty requires that judicial review focus on assurance of that guarantee. Thus, the majority
in DeCoster II properly recognized the primacy of the sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, a guaranby the personal pretrial judgtee which should not be jeopardized
10 2
ment of assigned counsel.

Marilyn Labb Zeitlan
100. ABA STANDARDs, supra note 42, at 226.

101. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1201.
102. As this note went to press, the Fourth Circuit adopted the newer competency standard for effective assistance of counsel. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d
540 (4th Cir. 1977).
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